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Original Reading Group

The Mechanism Design for Social Good research group is a multi-institution, interdisciplinary group exploring research directions in various domains where insights from algorithms, optimization, and mechanism design can be used to improve access to opportunity.

We keep this website updated with our reading list and detailed discussion notes. The notes are taken by members of the group with some figures and texts taken from the accompanying presentations and papers. The organizers take responsibility for these notes.

SectionDateTopicSuggested ReadingSpeakerNotes
Developing World (Rediet)11/27/17Kudu: An Electronic Market for Agricultural Trade in Uganda1. About Kudu
2. Designing and Evolving an Electronic Agricultural Marketplace in Uganda
Kevin Leyton-BrownPDF
Developing World (Rediet)3/27/18Sensing with Farmers1. AI and Data Science Group
2. mCROPS project
Mutembesa Daniel, with Ernest MwebazePDF
Developing World (Rediet)4/17/18Land Trade and Development1. Land Trade and DevelopmentGharad BryanPDF
Developing World (Rediet)5/1/18Give Directly1. Give Directly WebsitePaul NiehausPDF
Developing World (Rediet)5/8/18Information and Communication Technology for Development1. UW ICTD Lab
2. BSpeak: An Accessible Crowdsourcing Marketplace for Blind People
3. “You Can Always Do Better!” The Impact of Social Proof on Participant Response Bias
Aditya VashisthaPDF
Civic Participation (Sam)2/20/18Participatory BudgetingAshish GoelPDF
Civic Participation (Sam)3/6/18Voter Fraud1. One Person, One Vote: Estimating the Prevalence of Double Voting in U.S. Presidential ElectionsSharad GoelPDF
Civic Participation (Sam)3/13/18Extreme Democracy1. Liquid Democracy: An Algorithmic Perspective
2. Preference Elicitation For Participatory Budgeting
3. A Voting-Based System for Ethical Decision Making
Ariel ProcacciaPDF
*Special Talk*1/23/18Privacy and Poverty1. The Class Differential in Privacy Law
2. Social Media, Privacy, and Personal Responsibility Among Low-SES Youth
3. The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full Disclosure Future
Rachel CummingsPDF
Bias and Diversity (Manish)10/2/17Designing Against Discrimination in Online Markets1. PreprintSolon BarocasPDF
Bias and Diversity (Manish)10/16/17Group Fairness in a Two-Stage Labor Market1. Fairness at Equilibrium in the Labor MarketLily HuPDF
Bias and Diversity (Manish)10/30/17Affirmative Action1. Valuing DiversityGlenn LouryPDF
Education (Irene)5/3/17Mechanism Design and Allocation SystemsCourse Allocation at Wharton

1. The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes
2. Bringing Real Market Participants: Real Preferences into the Lab: An Experiment that Changed the Course Allocation Mechanism at Wharton
3. Course Match: A Large-Scale Implementation of Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Combinatorial Allocation

School Choice in Boston

1. Optimal Allocation Without Money: An Engineering Approach
2. Assortment Planning in School Choice
3. Guiding School-Choice Reform through Novel Applications of Operations Research
IrenePDF
Education (Irene)5/10/17Financing and School Vouchers1. The Effects of School Spending on Educational and Economic Outcomes: Evidence from School Finance Reforms
2. School Vouchers: A Survey of the Economics Literature
IrenePDF
Education (Irene)5/24/17Information Problems in Education1. Leveraging Technology to Engage Parents at Scale: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial (and NPR interview)
2. Improving School Choice Through Informed Residential Choice: Preliminary Evidence from a Large-Scale, Randomized Trial (preliminary) – site from the RCT
Eric ChanPDF
Online Labor Markets (Kira)3/1/17Some issues in designing online labor markets1. Price Floors and Employer Preferences
2. Buyer Uncertainty about Seller Capacity
John J. HortonPDF
Online Labor Markets (Kira)3/22/17Market Power Asymmetry and Possible Mediation1. Accounting for Market Frictions and Power Asymmetries in Online Labor Markets
2. Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy?
Kira, Sid SuriPDF
Online Labor Markets (Kira)3/29/17Mechanism Design in Online Platforms1. Facilitating the search for partners on matching platforms: Restricting agent actions
2. Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets
3. Matching while learning
Yash KanoriaPDF
Economic Inequality (Rediet)1/18/17Is there anything money can’t buy? Opportunities in the 21st century.1. Absolute Income Mobility
3. The Fading American Dream Project
4. Optional: Recent Developments in Intergenerational Mobility
5. Optional: Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the U.S.
David GruskyPDF
Economic Inequality (Rediet)2/1/17Optimal Redistributive Taxation1. Empirical Research on Economic Inequality (Chapters 1, 2, 10)Maximilian KasyPDF
Economic Inequality (Rediet)2/22/17Health Inequality1. The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014
2. The Health Inequality Project
Michael StepnerPDF
Economic Inequality (Rediet)4/12/17Labor Market Imperfections, Unions, and Economic InequalitySuresh NaiduPDF
*Special Talk*1/11/17Matching Markets and Refugee Resettlement1. Refugee Resettlement (Sections 1, 2, 8, 9, 10)
2. Market Design blog
Alex Teytelboym
Healthcare (Matt)11/17/16Insurance Company Incentives1. Data-driven incentive alignment in capitation schemes
2. Strategic Classification
MattPDF
Healthcare (Matt)11/30/16Health Insurance Policy and Market Design IssuesMark ShepardPDF
Healthcare (Matt)12/15/16Overview on the Global Burden of Disease Study1. Global Burden of DiseaseAbraham FlaxmanPDF
Housing (Dan)9/26/16Eviction, Causal Effects of Place, and Low-Income Housing Assistance in the U.S.1. Housing Affordability and Eviction
2. A nice 538 Article on the MARS study
3. Interim results from the MTO (Moving to Opportunity) experiment
4. Long-run effects on the kids
5. Policies in the U.S.
6. Another nice 538 Article
DanPDF
Housing (Dan)10/10/16Centralized Solutions to Public Housing Allocation1. Low Income Housing Policy (Sections I-III)
2. [Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Waiting Lists](http://www.columbia.edu/~jl4130/Leshno - Dynamic Matching in Waiting Lists.pdf)
Dan, IrenePDF
Housing (Dan)10/27/16Regulation1. Externalities and property rights
2. Building restrictions
3. Construction and affordable housing
DanPDF

Members #

Organizers #

Organizers #


Rediet Abebe, Cornell University #


Rediet Abebe is a PhD candidate in computer science at Cornell University, where she is advised by Jon Kleinberg. Her research focuses on algorithms, AI, and their applications to social good. In particular, her research applies algorithmic, computational, and network-based insights to better understand and mitigate socioeconomic inequality. In addition to MD4SG, she also co-founded and co-organizes the Black in AI group. Her work is generously supported by fellowships and scholarships through Facebook, Google, and the Cornell Graduate School. She is also a Harvard-Cambridge Scholar. She was born and raised in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Kira Goldner, University of Washington #


Kira Goldner is a PhD student in Computer Science and Engineering at the University of Washington, advised by Anna Karlin. Her research focuses on problems in mechanism design, particularly in maximizing revenue in settings that are motivated by practice, such as those where buyer distributions are unknown or buyers are risk-averse. She is also beginning to work on mechanism design within health insurance. She is a 2017 recipient of the Microsoft Research PhD Fellowship and was a 2016 recipient of a Google Anita Borg Scholarship. Kira received her B.A. in Mathematics from Oberlin College and also studied at Budapest Semesters in Mathematics.

Participants #


Ellora Derenoncourt, Harvard University #


Ellora Derenoncourt is a graduate student in economics at Harvard University, specializing in public and labor economics, economic history, and microeconomic theory. Her research employs a range of methods to understand the determinants of current and historical inequality, including field experimental and theoretical work on firms and fairness and analyses of historical data on economic mobility and racial inequality.

Alon Eden, Tel Aviv University #


Alon Eden is a PhD student in the Computer Science department at Tel Aviv University. He is advised by Amos Fiat and Michal Feldman. His research interests have focused on algorithmic game theory, and mainly pricing algorithms. In particular, he is interested in finding out whether resources can be allocated efficiently using prices when agents are selfish and arriving online.

Lily Hu, Harvard University #


Lily Hu is a PhD student in applied mathematics at Harvard University where she is advised by Yiling Chen and works on algorithmic fairness and ethics in artificial intelligence. Broadly, her academic interests include algorithmic game theory, statistical inference, and theories of justice. Her current time is divided between economics/computer science research, where she studies fairness in algorithmic settings, and philosophy/ethics work, where she considers algorithmic fairness as it relates to notions of procedural, substantive, and distributive justice. Lily graduated from Harvard College in 2015 with an A.B. in Mathematics.

Anna Karlin, University of Washington #


Anna R. Karlin is the Microsoft Professor of Computer Science and Engineering at the University of Washington. Her research is primarily in theoretical computer science: algorithmic game theory, and the design and analysis of algorithms, particularly probabilistic and online algorithms. She is an ACM Fellow and a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Jon Kleinberg, Cornell University #


Jon Kleinberg is the Tisch University Professor of Computer Science and Information Science at Cornell University. His research focuses on algorithmic issues at the interface of networks and information, with an emphasis on the social and information networks that underpin the Web and other on-line media. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering.

Irene Lo, Columbia University #


Irene Lo is a Ph.D. student in the IEOR Department at Columbia University. Her main research areas are in the intersection of operations research, computer science and economics. In particular, she is interested in how to optimally allocate scarce resources while incorporating the preferences of strategic agents, and in developing mathematical and algorithmic tools to answer this question. She currently works in matching market design, with a focus on school choice mechanisms. Irene graduated from Princeton University in 2013 with an A.B. in mathematics.

Manish Raghavan, Cornell University #


Manish Raghavan is a PhD student at Cornell advised by Jon Kleinberg. He studies human decision-making and behavioral biases using techniques from theoretical computer science. He also works on understanding the effects that algorithmic decision-making has on society, focusing on fairness in machine learning. He received his B.S. from UC Berkeley in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science in 2016, and he is a recipient of an NSF GRFP fellowship.

Sam Taggart, Oberlin College #


Sam Taggart is an assistant professor of computer science at Oberlin College. Before joining the department, he completed his doctoral study at Northwestern University in 2017 under the supervision of Jason Hartline. His research interests lie at the intersection of theoretical computer science and mathematical economics. Some of his recent projects have studied the interplay between economic incentives and statistical learning and the performance of practical resource allocation protocols such as the first-price auction.

Dan Waldinger, MIT #


Dan Waldinger is a graduate student in economics at MIT doing research in empirical market design. His work focuses the allocation of organs and public housing (fortunately they are allocated separately), and quantifies how waiting times provide incentives to economic agents in these dynamic mechanisms. Before graduate school, he lived in Cairo and worked at Microsoft Research after graduating from the University of Chicago. He grew up in Newton, MA.

Matt Weinberg, Princeton University #


Matt Weinberg is an Assistant Professor of computer science at Princeton University. His research focuses on algorithmic mechanism design, including multidimensional auctions. His thesis on this topic was awarded the ACM SIGecom doctoral dissertation award. More recently, he’s additionally working on mechanism design for cryptocurrencies and social good domains.